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NOTES AND COMMENTS 71
)
holding in the instant case: (1) A did not acquire the knowledge
while acting as an officer of Y corporation; (2) it was to the interest
of X corporation that Y corporation should not know of irregularities
in title to the land; hence, it could not be presumed that A would
communicate the knowledge to Y corporation.
The fact that A did not acquire the knowledge while acting as an
officer of Y corporation would not have been conclusive, in many
jurisdictions, if it had appeared that he had acted for Y corporation
with the knowledge actually in mind;19 but there was no such find-
ing. Furthermore, the sole-representative doctrine is not applicable
to the facts.20 The second reason advanced seems entirely adequate.
That A would communicate his knowledge to Y corporation under
the circumstances is contrary to experience. 21
Wm. ADAMs, JR.
Criminal Law-Effect of Void Sentence.
Plaintiff was indicted on three counts, convicted and sentenced to
one term of one year and one day and to two terms of six months
each; confinement in Leavenworth. A federal statute provided that
no prisoner be sentenced to a penitentiary except the period be for
longer than one year.' After plaintiff had served the first two terms
and two months on the third, he petitioned for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, contending that the sentence under which he was serving was
void in that the court did not have jurisdiction to impose it. Held,
sentences two and three are void. Writ ordered to be issued but with-
out prejudice to the United States to have plaintiff sentenced in ac-
cordance with the law on the verdict against him.
2
the particular transaction, there remains only one possibility of imputation of
knowledge through A to Y corporation; and that is, that A's authority was so
general as to constitute him the alter ego of the corporation in respect to all
its business. The statement of facts would indicate that he had quite general
authority: "The two corporations occupied the same offices and were under the
general control and management of" A. Does the court recognize such gen-
eral authority in A, or instead, does it regard his authority as limited, and
therefore rely on the absence of a finding that he was acting in regard to a
matter over which his authority extended?
See note 13, supra.
Because Y corporation was also represented in the transaction by a loan
committee, which considered the details of the loan. See McFerson et al. v.
Bristol, supra note 9, at 396, in which the court intimates that the sole actor
rule would not have been applicable had there been a discount committee in-
volved, and not only the agent alone.
' 14a C. J. 491, §2359 (2).
'13 Stat. 500 (1865), 18 U. S. C. A. §695 (1927).
'Copeland v. Archer, 50 F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
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If plaintiff was guilty of three separate offences, sentences two
and three were rightly held to be void,a since it is necessary that judg-
ments in criminal cases conform strictly to the statute both as to the
character and extent of the punishment inflicted.4 But under the
doctrine of Ex parte Friday,5 which is to the effect that where there is
but one indictment, one trial and one judgment, there can be but a
single sentence, the sentence in the instant case would not be treated
as void but as merely irregular, and the term of imprisonment there-
under as for two years and one day-the total of the three sentences.
The weight of authority sustains the principal case, but query
whether the doctrine of Ex parte Friday does not offer a better solu-
tion. Under the principal case, the plaintiff was not freed when the
writ of habeas corpus was granted, but, having been lawfully con-
victed, he was subjected to the possibility of a longer sentence; 6
whereas, under Ex parte Friday, the sentence would have been valid
except for the excess 7 over the statutory provisions (one day8 ), and
the writ would not have issued.9  PAUL BOUCHER.
'Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U. S. 396, 23 L. ed. 889 (1876) (as to when con-
finement must be in a federal penitentiary, when in a state penitentiary, and
when discretionary).
"Harman v. U. S., 50 Fed. 921 (D. Kan. 1892) ; Harman v. U. S., 68 Fed.
742 (D. Kan. 1895) (motion to resentence) ; Woodruff v. U. S., 58 Fed. 776
(D. Kan. 1893) ; Reynolds v. U. S., 96 U. S. 145, 25 L. ed. 244 (1878) ; In re
Pridgeon, 57 Fed. 200 (S. D. Ohio, 1893) ; it re Christian, 82 Fed. 199 (W. D.
Ark. 1897) ; Ex parte Karstendick, supra note 3; In re Graham, 138 U. S. 461,
11 Sup. Ct. 363, 34 L. ed. 1051 (1890) ; Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. 163, 21 L. ed.
872 (1873) ; In re, Mills, supra note 4; It re Johnson, 46 Fed. 477 (D. Mass.
1891) ; Whitworth v. U. S., 114 Fed. 302 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) ; BYRNE, FED-
ERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §365.
'43 Fed. 916 (N. D. N. Y. 1890) (fact situation similar to principal case;
indictment for larceny on three counts with three separate sentences, one and
two being for one year each confinement to be in a penitentiary).
'In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 10 Sup. Ct. 384, 33 L. ed. 835 (1889) ; In re
Christian, supra note 4; Hammers v. U. S., 279 Fed. 265 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) ;
It re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242, 14 Sup. Ct. 323, 38 L. ed. 107 (1890) ; U. S. v.
Harman, sipra note 4; U. S. v. Motherwell, 103 Fed. 198 (E. D. Pa. 1900)
rehearing 107 Fed. 437 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1901). Contra: Ex parte Lange, supra
note 4. Cf. Ny Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 42 Sup. Ct. 492, 66 L. ed.
938 (1921) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 40 Sup. Ct. 566, 64 L. ed.
1011 (1919); Chin Yow v. U. S., 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 182, 52 L. ed. 379
(1919) ; Charlie Wong v. Esola, 6 F. (2d) 828 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
" De Bara v. U. S., 99 Fed. 942 (C. C. A. 6th, 1900) ; Harlan v. McGourin,
218 U. S. 442, 31 Sup. Ct. 44, 54 L. ed. 1101 (1910) ; U. S. v. Peeke, 153 Fed.
156 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1907); Collins v. Morgan, 243 Fed. 495 (C. C. A. 8th,
1917).
'35 Stat. 1113 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §240 (1927) (maximum sentence two
years).
'De Bara v. U. S., supra note 7; In re Pridgeon, supra note 4; In re
Bonner, supra note 6; In re Swan, 150 U. S. 637, 14 Sup. Ct. 225, 37 L. ed. 787
(1893).
